Brigham Young University Law School

BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Supreme Court Briefs (pre-1965)

1959

J. Golden Barton Motor Co. v. Calvin D. Jackson :
Supplemental Brief of Respondent
Utah Supreme Court

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/uofu_sc1
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief submitted to the Utah Supreme Court; funding for digitization provided by the
Institute of Museum and Library Services through the Library Services and Technology Act,
administered by the Utah State Library, and sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library; machinegenerated OCR, may contain errors.
Adam M. Duncan; Attorney for Plaintiff and Respondent;
Recommended Citation
Brief of Respondent, J. Golden Barton Motor Co. v. Jackson, No. 9011 (Utah Supreme Court, 1959).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/uofu_sc1/3292

This Brief of Respondent is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Supreme
Court Briefs (pre-1965) by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact
hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu.

AULJo 1959

IN THE SUPREME COURT

State of

r I LED

- - - - - - - - - JLLI!:ll 7 1959
---)-·-------------------------

J. GOLDEN BAR TON. MOTOR COMPANY, IN CORPORA TED

)Clerk, Supreme C~~ri,···u:,:;;;···-~

)

Plaintiff and Respondent
VS•

CALVIN D. JACKSON
Defendant and Appellant

)
)
)
)
)
)
)

Case-' No. 9011

--------------~-~

SUPPLEMENTAL BRIEF OF RESPONDENT
JOHN ELWOOD

DEN~mTT

Attorney for Plaintiff and
Respondent

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

IN THE SUPREME COURT
State of Utah

J. GOLDEN BARTON MOTOR COMPANY, INCORPORATED

Plaintiff & Respondent
VSo

CALVIN Do JACKSON

Defendant and Appellant

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

Case No. 9011

)

---------------~~)
SUPPLEMENTAL BRIEF OF RESPONDENT

JOHN ELWOOD DENNETT
Attorney for Plaintiff and
Respondent

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

liNDER THE CONTRACT WAS CONDITI:JNAL, THE CONTft4CT WAS UNCON ....

DITIONAL IN REQUIRIN:J THE PE:tFJRMANCE OF ONE OF TNO .ALTEc't-

NAT!VESti
PuiNT THREE
THE DE~1:NDANTS l~'.AILUrtE TO PER.II'ORM ONE OP' THE TNO AVAIL""'
ABLE ALTEitNATlVES UNDER THE CONrrRACT CONSTITUTED A BREACH
0!1 CONTHACT.
1

POINT 11'0 UR
THE PROPER MEASURE, OF LEGAL DAMAGES IS THE CONTRACT

PtiCE LESS THE WHOLES1,LER 1S DELIVERED PRICE TO THE HETAILERe

POINT FIVE
IN LIEU OF LEGAL DAMAGES, STIPULATED LIQUIDATED DAMAGES
SHOULD BE AWA1IDED UNLESS !T IS FOUND THAT EITHER (l) THE
SUM STIPULATED IS A "PENALTY", OR (2) THE SUM IS DISPl10Ei3
1

PORTIONATE TO THE LEOAL

DA~.GES

THE REPUDIATEE WOULD BE ENTITI

TO.

POIWr SIX
THI AWARD FOR STIPULATED DAMAGES SHOULD BE GIVEN TO
OR !N THE ALTERNATIVE THE CASE SHOULD BE Fti!lUNDED

PLAINTIFl~'

TO ASSESS ACTUAL COMPENSATORY DAMAGES UNDER THE RUlE O!t"

STEWART VS@ HANSEN e
ARGUMENT
f9_IN1;_J?j~

AN

ENll'OHC.iliABL~

AND D~~'ENDANT II

CONTRACT WAS ENT.ErtED INTO BE1'\tr!EN PLAIN1'l]

The brief ot the appellant urges the position that no

contract was enter.ed into between plaintiff and defendant
This position 1s untenable in light oi.' the facts@

f)

The court need only to look at the .final portions o£
the negotiations between plaintiff ~md de.t'end&nt to determine
whether there in fact was a contract between plaintiff and
defendant, This court should apply the "reasonable man"
teat in ev~luating and interpreting the acts o£ plainti££s
~nd defendants
in terms o£ their legal meaning and effectSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
l Veness.
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Ignoring the preliminary negotiations, when the offer
of 36 monthly payments of ·$100 .. 00 was rejected by the plaintiff
and counter-offer of $112 .. 00 per month was made, and defendant said, ''Well, I guess that will be alright a" Reasonable
men would have to agree that a contract came into being ..
Perhaps defendant feels that "Dean's mistake" rescinded
or cancelled the contract.. It is too fundamental to need
citation that the bilateral contracts cannot be unilaterally
rescinded or cancelledo
When the plaintiff attempted to raise the figure to
$118.74, (wh; ~h. by the wav- wonl rl_ not result i r q usurious
contract, this monthly repaymen~ [36 x $118. 74_) Nould result
in a repayment of $4,274o64 or in an excess o.r $694 .. 64 over
the unpaid principal balance of ·$3,580.00.. The maximum
legal rate provided by DCA 15-l-2a(3) would be 1% per month
or 36% of $3,580o00 or a finance charge of $1,288 .. 80); this
I
in no way changed the rights of the parties o Had the plaintiff I
attempted to enforce the payments of ~118 74 against the
'
defendant, the defendant could have effectively resisted.,
o

If she alternative is this court interprets the subsequent acts of the plaintiff and defend ~ nt as being a mutual
rescission of contract which provided for $112 .. 00 payments,
then this court must decide what interpretation is to be
attached to the tender and delivery of the $3,680 .. 00 check,
(albeit its payment was conditional).. The only reasonable
meaning that can be given this overt act is that it manifested
the defendants assent to the terms of the $118 .. 74/month
contract, RESERVING, HGWEVER, THE OPTION of alternatively
performing the contract to purchase by securing his own financing elsewhere and paying an additional $100o00 for the
automobile e
What other meaning could it have in view of the fact
iliat the writing of the check was induced by, was responsive
to, and was executed pursuant to the written option to finance
elsewhere noted on the edge of the contract?
Xhe whole transaction should be viewed as of the time
it was entered into.. The question of whether or not there was
in fact a contract sho11ld be dAt.erminPii hv ascertaining the
intent of the parties as may be reasonable inferred or concluded from their acts and words. What inference can be
jrmm exept the intention of the defendant to say, by his
acts and words, "I accept your contract providing for alterby the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
lative Sponsored
performance,
tt and will perform one alternative or
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
the other.
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POINT Tl/0
,.

ALTHOUGH THE PERFJaMANCE OF ONE OF 'rHE ALTERNATIVES
THE CONTRACT WAS CONDITIONAL, THE CONTRACT WAS UNCONDITIONAL IN REQUIRING THE PERFORMANCE OF ONE OF . 'IWO ALTERNATIVES.

~UNDER

In urging that the contract entered into was condition-

11, the appellant has confused the meaning of a "conditional"
contract and a contract requiring performance in the "alternative."
Quoting the case of Crane vs., Peet 4 A 72 at· · 78; 43
NJ Eq553 WORDS AND PHRASES, unqer the caption of Alternative
Contracts says, "(an alternative contract is) a contract
which gives either the promisor or the promisee the option
of electing between one of two or more al ternat'lve performances.
Alternative contracts are such as bytheir terms may be
performed by doing either of several ac-t s at the election of
the party from whom performance ·is due;.,'' (See also 1 Suther=
land on Damages p., 471)"
POINT ·THREE
THE- DEFENDANT 1 S FAILURE TO PERFORM ONE OF THE TWO
AVAILABLE ALTERNATIVES UNDER THE CONTRACT CONSTITUTED
A BREACH OF CONTRACT.,

Referring to Section 325 of the Restatement of Conwe read:

~

Breach of a contract that requires performance of one
of two or more alternatives that the . promisor may elect
may be caused by (a) faillire to perform at least one of
the alternatives within the rule stated in Section 314
of the Restatement of Contracts"
The question is strictly academic whether or not one of
the alternatives bei11g conditional, the rule of law was
changed. Since it was· the defenddnts perrogative to choo~
between his alternatives, it makes no difference that the
performance of one of the alternatives was conditional, and
the other was unconditional.,
Upon the completion of the contract, the defendant had
Law
Library.
Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
the
two
alternatives:
his Sponsored
choiceby theofS.J. Quinney
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the balance on

t~ contract at $112.,00

per month in accordance with the contract termso (or
$ll8o74 per month if the court finds that this was the
contracto)
(2) Secure his own financing elsewhere and pay off the
entire balance by permitting the plaintiff to negotiate
the conditionally issued checko

Obviously the plaintiff could not require the defendant
to perform both alternativeso If the defendant elected to
perform alternative #1, this would act as a condition
subsequent, voiding the check which had been issued her·etofore o
If the defendant elected to perform alternative #2, this
would be complete performance of the contract and would
terminate his obligation· to make future monthly installments o
The third alternative, which the defendant chose, namely
perform neither al terna tive, is a breach ..
If the defendant had elected alternative #l or alter~
native #2, the plaintiff would have had no cause to complain,
then according to the terms of the contract, this was a
matter of free choice to the defendant.
However, i f the defendant refuses to perform either alternative, it is immaterial that the contract provided for alternative performanceo This is the same as a simple repudiation
of a singular covenant to perform a given act.

THE PROPER MEASURE OF LEGAL DAMAGES IS THE CONTRACT
PRICE LESS THE WHOLESALER'S DELIVERED PRICE TO THE RETAILERo
The proper rule of law be applied in cases such as this
flows from the concept that if a breach conferred a benefit
upon plaintiff as well as causing him damages, the measure of
recovery is the difference between the damage and benefito
McCormick, DAMAGES, states the rule as follows: (Seco40)
'~fuere a defendant's wrong or breach of contract has not
only caused damage but has also conferred a benefit upon
plaintiff which he would not otherwise have reaped, the
value of this benefit must be credited to defendant in
assessing damageso"

Obviously the plaintiff cannot recover the entire contract
8
balance
from
the
defendant,
the
breach
has
Sponsored
by the S.J.
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1

have otherw~e d~@h

eompeiled

t o purchase from the manufactureJ :

McCormick at Section 147 continues:
"For example, an automobile dealer sues a customer for
refusal to carry out a contr2ct to purchase a car. The
market value of a new car is (usually) the standard
retail price of that model, but defendant's breach has noi
increased the possibility of finding a new customer for
such a caro From the agent's point of view, the supply
of new cars from the factory is unrestricted, but the
finding of new customers is limited, and is not simply
a matter of offering the article upon a ready and practically unlimited market, as in the case of wheat, cotton,
and the likeo It requires elaborate advertising, expensive demonstrations and continued solicitation. The
plaintiff recovers, then, the agreed price, less what
he has really been saved, that is, less the cost of the
car from the factory. (Citing Torkmian vs. Russell,
90 Conn. 481, 97 A 760 (1916), and Stewart vs. Hansenj
62 Utah 281, 218 Paco 959, ALR 340).
Section 173 of McCormick on Damages (page 661) elaborates on this principal further:
In the absence of an "available market" for goods, not
only may the seller have open the choice of fixing his
damages by a resale, but he may often have-available
still other formula for measuring his loss. He may
claim compensation in the amount of the difference
between what it has cost him to acquire the goods from
otherso
and the contract price. The difference is
the seller's prospective direct (gross) profit • • •
Not infrequent are cases of actions by dealers against
customers for refusal to accept automobiles purchased.
Neither 11 resale price" nor nmarket value" gives any
adequate relief, since the dea1er would ordinarilly re-sel
at regular list price, and the market value of the
car can be said to be the same as the contract priceo
o

•

The Utah Supreme Court has adopted this principal
in the case of Stewart vs. Hansen cited supra, and it is

submitted that this is good law, and still the law in Utah.
POINT .F'IVE
IN LIEU OF LEGi.L DAMP..GES, STIPULATED LIQUIDATED D1\Mi'GES
SHOULD BE AWARDED UNLESS IT IS FOUND THAT EITHER ( 1) THE STJl-1
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
STIPULATED
IS A Library
PENALTY,
oa (2)
THE SU
MUtah
ISStateDISPROPORTIONATE
Services and Technology
Act, administered
by the
Library.

Machine-generated
OCR, may contain
errors. BE OTHERWISE ENTITLED
TO THE LEGIL NltJtots 1'HE
R·EPUD£1(li(_E
WOULD

'!'he sta·udl1leilt 61 law ln t his jurisdiction is set forth
in Bramwell Investment Co. vs. Uggla, 81 Utah 85, 16 Pac.
2nd 913 at 916.
-This court is committed to the doctrine that, where the
to a contract stipulate the amount of damages
that shall be paid in case of a breach, such stipulation
is, as a general rule, enforceable, if the amount
stipulated is not disproportionate to damages actually
sustained.

part~es

This court has never departed from this pos~tion, and
this general rule is even cited approvingly in the leading
case of Perkins vs. Spencer, 443 P 2nd 446 at page 449, which
refused to sustain the liquidated damages stipulation upon
the special facts of that case.
Certainly, upon special findings of fact, the court may
invoke exceptions to the general rule, as it iP done in Young
vs. Hansen, Croft vs. Jenoen, and Perkins vs. Spencer, and
others cited in appellant's brief. One need only to read the
cases to see whyo In each case the court has found, as matter of fact that either (l) the stipulated damages were a
penalty or (2) the stipulated damages were disproportionate
to the actual damages o
POINT SIX

THE AWARD FOR STIPULATED DAMAGES SHOULD BE GIVEN TO
PLAINTIFF OR IN THE ALTERNATIVE THE CASE SHOUlD BE REMANDED
TO ASSESS ACTUAL COMPENSATORY DAMAGES UNDER THE RULE OF'
STEWART VS ~~ HANSEN.
It is common knowledge that-a $4,ooo.oo automobile has
a greater dealer mark-up than $)00.00 and if the rule of
Stewart vs. Hansen were applied to this case, the plaintiff
should recover judgment in excess of $1,000.00. The defendant should let "well enough" alone, and not urge this court
to look beyond the stipulated damages. If· the plaintiff is
willing to accept an amount stipulated, although substantially
less than his legal damages, as liquidating damages, the
defendant has no cause to complain. The plaintiff . is not urgir
the issue of disproportionate damages, and the defendant, in
his own interest and welfare, should cease to urge it.
This Honorable Court has raised the question of the
status of a non-negotiated check as being the basis of a
forfeiture. Upon reflection, this counsel believes
deposit
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
that this is only
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The real question is not whether or not the plaintiff
has actually received the deposit shown, but was the face
value thereof the agreed measure of liquidated damages the
seller should receive if the buyer breached his contract.
Oft times ~ credit is given for a trade-in. Would it
be reasonable to argue that the seller would have received
nothing from the buyer until the "trade-inn had been liquidated (sold)? Would it be reasonable to argue that a "side
note" would be unenforceable if it were given as a symbol of
the liquidated damages agreed upon. Suppose a "bearer bond"
or "American Express Travelers Checques" or a ''postal money
order" or a ncashier' s check" had been given as a deposit.
While a non-negotiated check is technically a chose
in action, in our modern business world it is the equivilant
of cash. Bearer government bonds, Travelers Checques,
postal money orders, bank draft::, also fall in this category
of chases in action. Are we going to require that prospective purchasers made deposits in currency? (which +.Achnically
is also only chose in action, being Treasury Certificates,
Silver Certificates, or Federal Reserve Noves.)
If this be the feeling of this court, then this counsel
respectfully urges that no damages is so disproportionate
to actual damages that the stipulated damage should be
re-examined and case should be remanded to assess damages
~der the rule of Stewart vsG Hansen.

CONCLUSION
A valid contract, requiring alternative performance was
entered into between plaintiff and defendant. Defendant
refused to perform either alternative, and thusly breached
his contract. Plaintiff would have been entitled to compensatory damages, but because he has agreed to a lesser sum ·
as liquidated damages, he must limit himself to such amount.

WHEREFORE plaintiff prays that the judgment of the Distr:
Court be sustained, or in the alternative, that the case be
remanded to ascertain the actual compensc;,tory damages based u]
a rule of law set forth in point four above, and that the
plaintiff have his costs of this appeal.
Respectfully submitted

JOHN ELWOOD DENNETT
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